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REMEDIES UNIFIED IN NINE VERSES 
CAPRICE L. ROBERTS* 
 
Consistency is not always “the hobgoblin of little minds” 1 
Walls tumble down ‘tween East and West, unification at its best 
“Treating like cases alike” 2 (Justice, she is not blind.) 
While at the margins, putting artificial walls of rigid (doctrinal) boxes to rest. 3 
The beauty and magic of Remedies as a field 4 
Is that it nimbly navigates the nooks and crannies of the Law 
Honoring tradition while enabling progress, 5 yielding a right-of-way 
As necessary, pushing the boundaries of the Rule of Law. 
Remedies carefully bends doctrine toward justice.6 
Rather than thematic coherence for the law of Remedies throughout 
Law’s open edges—principles, factors, and totalities of Remedies buttress, 
Rounding the rough edges, Remedies pours from a (non-unified) flexible spout. 
A unified theory of Remedies, 
This Author does not see or glean. 
Other scholars have sought to cure such perceived maladies 7 
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The variation of Remedies’ applications and goals 
Should be a majestic 9 character trait embraced 
It adjusts to serve justice (sometimes corrective) 10 aiming to cure (souls). 
Avoiding, in the ideal, palm-tree justice, 11 with principled reason traced. 
Endeavor to complete the merger of Law and Equity 12  
Eradicate arcane anachronistic hurdles, we must. 
(re)Envision so-called extraordinary equitable remedies, unneeded complexity; 
Teach the doctrinal links and guiding principles so even SCOTUS gets the thrust. 13 
Remedies, with all its facets like Restitution, 14  is ripe for international collaboration. 
Engaging in community dialogue about access to Remedies, its nature and scope; 
Remedies demonstrating Law as artful craft, not robotic, algorithmic calculation. 
Following global examples, logically extending remedy and underlying right to render hope. 
Local and international examples of rights woefully without remedies abound .15  
Lawyers and courts misperceive when remedies may and may not lie. 16  But cf. 
Efficient breach (underdeterring advantage-taking, where a remedy ought redound).17 
Fear not for wise discretion and reasoned elaboration will properly gap-fill where justified. 
Remedies, ideally shaped, serves and unifies rights as it goes 18  
Where the wrong warrants, Remedies provides practical relief to end fights, 
Gives the Law, like water, its essential and inherent flow 
With normative goals in (her) sights, Remedies shapes substantive rights. 19 
                                                        
© 2015 Caprice L. Roberts. 
* Professor of Law, Savannah Law School.  This work is the result of a decade of 
thoughtful, provocative conversations with Doug Rendleman, Doug Laycock, Andrew Kull, 
Elaine Shoben, Jean Love, Michael Allen, Candace Kovacic-Fleischer, and Andrew Wright.  
I also owe a debt of gratitude to Dan Dobbs for inviting me to join DOBBS ON REMEDIES as 
a coauthor, retracing his pioneering work and gaining a lifetime of insights.  Thanks also 
to Judd Sneirson for sage counsel throughout the revision process.  Sincere thanks as well 
to my research assistant Cameron C. Kuhlman for engaging in thoughtful dialogue on 
Remedies and unification and offering valuable feedback.    
1.  See RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self Reliance, in ESSAYS AND ENGLISH TRAITS 66 
(Charles W. Eliot ed., 1909) (“A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, 
adored by little statesman and philosophers and divines.”).  But see Antonin Scalia, Assorted 
Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 587–88 (1990) 
(criticizing Emerson’s disdain for consistency as well as any judicial or scholarly 
proponents of the same, and maintaining instead “[c]onsistency is the very foundation of 
the rule of law”). 
2.  H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 
623–24 (1958) (positing that basic justice requires publicly announced, judicially enforced 
general rules that treat like cases alike).  But see Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating Like Cases 
Alike, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1974) (arguing “Hart’s thesis regarding a necessary 
connection between general rules and a minimum of justice is mistaken, principally as a 
consequence of his misunderstanding the function of the principle of treating like cases 
alike”). 
3.  Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 MICH. L. REV. 
559, 587 (2006) (lamenting American law’s private law doctrinal rigidity and narrowness: 
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“[W]hy should the availability of disgorgement turn on whether the wrongful publication 
fit into a property box or a contract box?”). 
4.  Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161, 162–64 
(2008); see also Jeff Berryman, Teaching Remedies in Canada, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 565, 565 
(2001) (“Within common law Canada there are sixteen law schools.  In all schools 
Remedies is taught as a distinct subject in the upper year curriculum.”); Jeffrey Berryman, 
The Law of Remedies: A Prospectus for Teaching and Scholarship, 10 OXFORD U. 
COMMONWEALTH L.J. 123, 123–24 (2010) (“Clearly, throughout the Commonwealth the 
systematic study of the law of remedies has come of age . . . .”).  But see Yehuda Adar & 
Gabriela Shalev, The Law of Remedies in a Mixed Jurisdiction: The Israeli Experience, 23 TUL. 
EUR. & CIV. L.F. 111, 115–21(2008) (lamenting that Remedies is not an established field in 
continental and common law jurisdictions beyond the United States). 
5.  BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112–13 (1921) 
(“My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this, and little more: logic, and history 
and custom, and utility, and the accepted standards of right conduct, are the forces which 
singly or in combination shape the progress of the law.  Which of these forces shall 
dominate in any case, must depend largely upon the comparative importance or value of 
the social interests that will be thereby promoted or impaired . . . .  [T]he most 
fundamental social interest[] is that law shall be uniform and impartial . . . .  Uniformity 
ceases to be a good when it becomes uniformity of oppression.”). 
6.  Martin Luther King, Jr., How Long, Not Long (Mar. 25, 1965) (“How long? Not 
long, because the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.”). 
7.  See, e.g., Marco Jimenez, Remedial Consilience, 62 EMORY L.J. 1309, 1309 (2013) 
(maintaining that scholars have paid too little theoretical attention to a unifying theory of 
remedies and claiming to offer a novel unifying theory fitting all remedies under four 
principles: “restoration, retribution, coercion, and protection”); Saul Levmore, Unifying 
Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2149, 2149 n.2 
(1997) (examining “the gamut of remedies” available in light of the Calabresian 
framework); Saul Levmore & William J. Stuntz, Remedies and Incentives in Private and Public 
Law: A Comparative Essay, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 483, 483–84 (1990) (construing Remedies as a 
series of positive and negative incentive effects from an economic perspective).  As 
Levmore and Stuntz concede, this work is significantly influenced and informed by 
Calabresi and Melamed’s seminal article, itself arguably presenting a unified theory of 
Law.  Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089, 1093–94, 1096–97 
(1972).  But cf. Doug Rendleman, Rejecting Property Rules-Liability Rules for Boomer’s Nuisance 
Remedy: The Last Tour You Need of Calabresi and Melamed’s Cathedral, in REMEDIES AND 
PROPERTY (Russell Weaver & François Lichère eds., 2013) (advancing experience and a 
functional approach—flexible and pragmatic common law—over the lure of theory).  For 
a positive expression of unified Remedies, see Adar & Shalev, supra note 4, at 111, 141 
(praising the Israeli Draft Civil Code section, “Remedies for Breach of an Obligation,” for 
seeking “to bring unity, coherence and simplicity to the law of remedies” by proposing “a 
unified and comprehensive statutory scheme for awarding remedies”). 
8.  Tatooine is a (Star Wars) planet that amassed “a very bad reputation, often being 
viewed as the cesspool of the galaxy.”  WOOKIEEPEDIA, THE STAR WARS WIKI, 
http://starwars.wikia.com/wiki/Tatooine.  For Remedies, this reputational pull 
(interpretation) is undeserved and is a corner from which we should not fight. 
9.  Honoring the historical roots of equity and equitable remedies, the Court of 
Chancery of England, the King. 
10. Stephen A. Smith, Remedies for Breach of Contract: One Principle or Two?, in GREGORY 
KLASS & PRINCE SAPRAI, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW (forthcoming 
2014) (advancing a two-remedy model and maintaining that damages serve corrective 
justice as punishment serves retributive justice). 
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11. This phrase stems from the image of a wise one rendering justice under a palm 
tree, but has garnered a pejorative connotation of compromised, unmoored justice.  See 
Barry Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil Law and Louisiana Law, 36 TUL. L. REV. 
605, 607 (1962) (“This arouses the lawyer’s habitual fear and dislike of ‘palm-tree 
justice’—of unregulated discretion—and if the doctrine were indeed general in this sense 
the hostility would be justified; for unregulated discretion is ultimately the negation of 
law . . . .  No system can undertake to remedy every unjust displacement of wealth . . . .  In 
fact the principal problem . . . has been precisely that of defining the limits within which it 
operates.  But . . . within those limits there is a single principle and a single remedy.  It is 
unitary, by contrast with the complex and fragmentary character of the common law 
rules.”). 
12. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE viii (1991) 
(calling for completion of the assimilation of equity); Caprice L. Roberts, The Restitution 
Revival and the Ghosts of Equity, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1027, 1033 (2011) (accord). 
13. The Supreme Court frequently misinterprets the law of Remedies.  See, e.g., eBay 
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (construing the injunction factors in an 
overly narrow and flawed fashion), as reprinted in DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. 
ROBERTS, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 269–73 (8th ed. 2010); Mertens v. Hewitt 
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255–56  (1993) (interpreting restitution narrowly as historically 
equitable); Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (regretting the Court’s botched ERISA reasoning regarding federal 
“equitable” remedies and urging the Court or Congress to fashion a fresh remedial 
structure to cure the epic misconstruction and injustices that would otherwise flow to 
plaintiffs under existing jurisprudence), discussed in Roberts, supra note 11, at 1039 n.69 
(finding the law of restitution misconstrued).  
14. The law of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment has its own doctrine as well as 
remedies.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. a 
(2011) (explaining that the law of unjust enrichment and restitution provides an 
independent basis of liability with a corresponding remedy as well as the remedy for 
violations of other substantive bodies of law such as torts, contracts, and intellectual 
property). 
15. See, e.g., Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (denying habeas 
corpus relief despite a proven constitutional violation); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 
456 U.S. 305 (1982) (ruling that a court retains discretion to deny injunctive relief even in 
the face of a proven statutory violation), as reprinted in RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 
11, at 373–81.  
16. See, e.g., Rosetta Stone, Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 165–66 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(construing unjust enrichment narrowly based on a misperceived quasi-contractual 
bounding); see also Daniel Gervais, Martin L. Holmes, Paul W. Kruse, Glenn Perdue & 
Caprice Roberts, Is Profiting from the Online Use of Another’s Property Unjust? The Use of Brand 
Names As Paid Search Keywords, 53 IDEA 131, 167–68 (2013) (critiquing the Rosetta Stone 
court’s cursory treatment of unjust enrichment theory). 
17. See generally Caprice L. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement As a Moral Compass for 
Breach of Contract, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 991, 992 (2009) (exploring a disgorgement remedy 
for opportunistic breaches of contract to prevent unjust enrichment and encourage 
promise keeping over myopic wealth maximizing); see also Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 587 
(advancing disgorgement). 
18. THE WAY OF LIFE ACCORDING TO LAOTZU 29 (Witter Bynner trans., Capricorn 
Books 1962) (“Man at his best, like water, Serves as he goes along . . . .”). 
19. CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES SHAPING RIGHTS (forthcoming manuscript). 
